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Abstract
Taxing capital gains is an important obstacle to the efficient allocation of
resources because it imposes a transaction cost on the vendor which locks in
appreciated assets by raising the vendor’s reservation price in prospective trans-
actions. For M&As, this effect has been intensively studied with regard to share-
holder taxation, whereas empirical evidence on the effect of capital gains taxes
paid by corporations is scarce. This paper analyzes how corporate level taxation
of capital gains affects inter-corporate M&As. Studying several substantial tax
reforms in a panel of 30 countries for the period of 2002-2013, we identify a
significant lock-in effect. Results from estimating a Poisson pseudo-maximum-
likelihood (PPML) model suggest that a one percentage point decrease in the
corporate capital gains tax rate would raise both the number and the total deal
value of acquisitions by about 1.1% per year. We use this result to estimate an
efficiency loss resulting from corporate capital gains taxation of 3.06 bn USD
per year in the United States.
JEL Classification: H25, G34
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1 Introduction
Capital gains taxation has long been identified as a potential obstacle for the efficient
allocation of capital (e.g. Feldstein & Yitzhaki, 1978). Being generally paid upon re-
alization, capital gains taxes impose payments on vendors of stock which these could
have deferred otherwise. The resulting lock-in effect raises the vendor’s reservation
price and makes a sale less attractive (e.g. Holt & Shelton, 1962; Landsman & Shack-
elford, 1995). These considerations have direct implications for corporate acquisition
activity. Capital gains taxation reduces the net gain of an acquisition deal from the
perspective of the vendor firm by triggering a high tax liability on accrued capital
gains that have been retained in the target firm. To compensate for this, the vendor
demands a higher price and, as a consequence, the deal becomes less attractive and
may even fail.
Despite the potentially high relevance of the lock-in effect, the empirical litera-
ture has, to a large extent, ignored the impact on acquisition activity of capital gains
taxes paid by corporations. In this paper we close this gap by providing empirical
evidence on how capital gains taxation on the corporate level affects the number and
volume of inter-corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As). An important aspect of
estimating the quantity rather than a price effect of capital gains taxation is that we
can relate the former to observed synergy gains from M&As and determine the po-
tential of corporate tax reforms to be efficiency enhancing in the market for corporate
control. Previous studies have pointed to increased productivity (Devos et al., 2009),
knowledge spillovers (Bresman et al., 1999; Bena & Li, 2014) as well as increased
management efficiency (Manne, 1965; Wang & Xie, 2009) and discipline (Scharfstein,
1988; Sapra et al., 2014) as important sources of gains that result directly from M&A
deals.
The eminent literature has frequently focused on the price effect of capital gains
taxes to provide evidence for a lock-in effect of individual shareholder taxation. Lands-
man & Shackelford (1995) use individual shareholder records from the 1989 RJR
Nabisco leveraged buyout to show that shareholders with a higher capital gains tax
payment demand higher compensation. Dai et al. (2008) disentangle the lock-in and
the capitalization effect of capital gains taxes on US stock prices. With regard to
M&As, Ayers et al. (2003) employ firm-level variation in capital gains tax payments
resulting from M&A deals on American stock exchanges and control for institutional
ownership to estimate a significantly positive effect of capital gains taxes on acquisi-
tion premia. They also find that increasing capital gains tax rates on the shareholder
level deplete acquisition activity on the US stock exchange (Ayers et al., 2007).
Most of these studies identify the lock-in effect by exploiting variation at the firm
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level.1 This approach is infeasible when analyzing the quantity effect. Instead, internal
validity has to be established by panel estimation methods. In our analysis we rely
on several exogenous tax reforms at different points in time which provides a feasible
way of identifying a causal relationship. We further exploit that these reforms did
not affect M&A deals where the decisive shareholder was not incorporated and utilize
these deals as a control group in additional estimations. Our estimations use the
Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator that is particularly suited for
our count data sample and also allows us to include fixed effects.
Our empirical results suggest that a one percentage point decrease in the tax
rate for the sale of substantial corporate shareholdings raises the number of deals by
1.1% per year. The same result is obtained when measuring acquisition activity in
terms of total deal volume. We therefore provide evidence of a significantly negative
effect of capital gains taxes on corporate acquisitions which is robust to a range of
model specifications. The causal relationship underlying our result is further verified
when using deals with unincorporated vendors as a control group. We show that
corporate capital gains tax reforms exclusively affect inter-corporate acquisition deals
suggesting that our results are unlikely to be driven by confounding variables. Relating
our main coefficient estimate to observed synergy gains from M&A deals we estimate
the efficiency loss in the market for corporate control resulting from corporate capital
gains taxation to amount to 3.06 bn USD per year in the United States.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple model to
analyze the lock-in effect in the case of inter-corporate acquisitions. Section 3 describes
tax and acquisition data and provides the econometric approach. We describe the
results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2 The Lock-in Effect for Corporate Acquisitions
The following model serves to clarify the relationship between capital gains tax rates
and inter-corporate acquisition activity via the lock-in effect on the vendor’s reserva-
tion price.2 We consider an acquisition deal where some vendor firm owns a target firm
and is offered the possibility to sell it to an acquiring firm. To simplify the exposition,
we consider all participating entities to be incorporated.
Assume that the vendor company holds shares in the target with a discounted
after-tax cash flow per share of
(
1− τV )D. τV is the effective tax rate from the
vendor perspective. If the vendor company sells the target, it receives a deal price of
PS per share. For simplicity, we assume that the vendor bought the target firm at
1The exception in this regard is Ayers et al. (2007) who use time-series data for the Unites States.
2The setup of the model follows classic approaches to modeling M&A taxation such as the one
used in Becker & Fuest (2011).
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zero cost, such that PS is identical to the capital gain per share realized through the
deal and taxed at the capital gains tax rate τCG. The vendor company accepts the
deal if the net revenue allows it to buy assets that provide an after-tax cash flow that
is larger or equal to the one received from the target such that PS must satisfy
(
1− τCG)PS ≥ (1− τV )D.
An implicit assumption underlying this condition is that the vendor reinvests the
revenue from selling the target into an asset which generates an identical after-tax cash
flow which is equivalent to assuming perfect capital markets. Though of simplifying
nature, this assumption allows us to isolate the lock-in effect. Assuming a reinvestment
in shares, we abstract from any mode of payment effect that occurs if the deal triggers
a change in the cash flow received by the vendor which could potentially be related
to a difference in tax treatment (e.g. Ohrn & Seegert, 2015). Then, the vendor’s
reservation price is given by
PS ≥ PResV =
1− τV
1− τCGD. (1)
PResV is equal to the expected after-tax cash flows if and only if τ
CG = 0. A positive
capital gains tax rate raises the reservation price above the value of the after-tax
cash flow of the target. More generally, the capital gains tax imposes an additional
tax burden on the act of selling the target which ceteris paribus makes the deal less
attractive from the vendor perspective.
Turning to the acquiring company, we assume that it is able to increase the dis-
counted cash flow from the target by ∆ (e.g. through better management or advanced
technology). The after-tax return per share of the target from the acquirer’s perspec-
tive is then given by
(
1− τA) (D + ∆) where τA is defined as the effective tax rate
faced by the acquiring firm. τA comprises profit taxes but also the potential deduc-
tion of financing costs and taxation arising from the repatriation of profits in the case
of a cross-border deal. The acquisition is financed by a reduction of credit market
investment or an increase in borrowing. Then, the acquirer’s reservation price is given
by
PS ≤ PResA =
(
1− τA) (D + ∆) . (2)
For simplicity, we assume that any deal that generates a positive net gain is com-
pleted.3 More specifically, we assume that acquirer and vendor firm are able to ne-
3A large strand of literature has analyzed how this gain is divided between the deal participants
(e.g. Bradley et al., 1988), also referring specifically to the incidence of capital gains taxation (e.g.
Huizinga et al., 2012). However, we do not model this process in detail since we are solely interested
in whether or not the deal is eventually completed in order to derive the impact of capital gains
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gotiate a price that allows them to somehow share the resulting gain and make the
deal beneficial for both companies. The deal is therefore completed if and only if
PResV ≤ PResA from which we can derive the cutoff level of synergy ∆˜ above which the
deal is always completed
PResV ≤ PResA ⇐⇒
1− τV
1− τCGD ≤
(
1− τA) (D + ∆)
⇐⇒∆ ≥ ∆˜ =
(
φ
1− τCG − 1
)
D, φ =
1− τV
1− τA . (3)
For the moment, let us ignore the differences in effective taxation between the ac-
quirer and the vendor (i.e. τA = τV ) so that φ = 1. It is apparent from (3) that
without capital gains taxation we have ∆˜ = 0 so that all acquisitions with a positive
economic gain are completed. In contrast, a positive capital gains tax rate requires
higher synergy gains to compensate for the tax payment resulting directly from the
deal.
In the market for corporate control, there is a finite number of possible targets
with synergy gains continuously distributed on the interval ∆ ∈ (∆, ∆¯), a cumulative
distribution function F and a corresponding probability function f . Under the as-
sumption that ∆˜ is interior, all deals with ∆ ≥ ∆˜ are completed. We can thus define
the number of deals as
n =
∆ˆ¯
∆˜
∆′d∆ = 1− F
(
∆˜
)
.
As long as F is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing, we have
n = n
(
τCG, · ) , ∂n (τCG, · )
∂τCG
= −f
(
∆˜
) ∂∆˜
∂τCG
< 0 (4)
so that an increase in the capital gains tax rate decreases the number of acquisitions.
This is commonly referred to as the lock-in effect of capital gains taxation on market
activity (e.g. Feldstein & Yitzhaki, 1978). Intuitively, the capital gains tax imposes a
transaction cost that reduces the net gain resulting from the inter-corporate acquisi-
tion deal.
In our exposition above we have defined n as the number of completed deals. It
is, however, straightforward to reformulate the model such that n represents the total
volume of all completed deals. As the economic impact of M&As may well depend on
the actual size of the deals rather than the absolute number, we measure acquisition
activity both as the number and the total volume of deals in our empirical estimation.
taxation on aggregate acquisition activity.
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3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Capital Gains Taxation of Corporations
Corporate capital gains are usually taxed proportionally to the general corporate
tax rate. Regarding capital gains realized through the sale of shares, the majority
of countries tax cash payments and allow for deferral in the case of stock-for-stock
deals. In the following analysis we focus on M&A deals that involve some sort of
cash payments for two reasons. First, even though there often exists a preferential tax
treatment of stock-for-stock deals, the large majority of acquisitions is still paid in
cash, mostly for non-tax reasons (see Erickson, 1998), and taxes are probably relevant
for the choice of payment only at the margin (Ayers et al., 2004). Second, if lowering
capital gains taxes unlocks corporate equity, firms are likely to prefer cash payments
because exchanging stock does not allow for immediate reinvestment.
The applicable tax rate differs substantially between countries. Some apply the
full corporate tax rate (e.g. Australia, Japan, United States) whereas others allow for
partial exemption (e.g. Canada, Portugal) or fully exempt capital gains from taxation
(e.g. New Zealand). Many countries provide for a preferential treatment in the form
of full exemption for gains realized from substantial holdings (e.g. Netherlands, Ire-
land) which is particularly relevant for firms holding controlling majorities in other
companies. A small number of countries also exempts acquisitions executed on the
stock market from taxation (e.g. Malta, Cyprus).
In our empirical estimation we use the tax rate applicable to capital gains that
are realized by corporations when selling shares in substantial holdings not listed on
the stock market to proxy for the taxation of corporate capital gains. We collect the
tax rate for 30 countries listed in Table 2 below where we also present the applicable
tax rate in 2013. Since 2002, a significant number of European countries has cut
corporate capital gains taxes for substantial holdings. Table 1 provides an overview of
these tax reforms. Besides the United Kingdom and Germany, who abolished capital
gains taxation for corporations in 2002, the group of reforming countries includes Italy
and France as well as several Scandinavian countries.
The reforms occurred in different points in time and the resulting tax cuts differed
substantially across reform countries and even more so when compared to non-reform
countries where corporate capital gains tax rates sometimes decreased in the course
of general corporate tax reductions. Figure 1 displays the changes in corporate capital
gains tax rates for all countries in our sample. It becomes apparent that the decrease in
capital gains tax strongly exceeds the corporate tax reduction in the reform countries,
particularly in those that have introduced a full exemption. Thus, even if controlling
for general corporate tax changes, we employ a rich variation in the tax rates to
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Table 1: Corporate Capital Gains Tax Reforms
This table summarizes the corporate capital gains tax reforms in our sample. Germany: From 2004
onward, 5% of the gains is added back to the taxable income representing non-deductible business ex-
penses. Sweden: Excluding non-substantial holdings on the stock market. Italy: 95% exemption from
2008 onward. France: 95% exemption for substantial holdings from 2007 onward. Iceland: Restricted
to substantial holdings from 2011 onward. Source: IBFD.
Implementation Type
Germany 2002 General exemption
Portugal 2002 50% exemption for substantial holdings
United Kingdom 2002 Exemption for substantial holdings
Sweden 2003 General exemption
Italy 2004 91% exemption
Ireland 2004 Exemption for substantial holdings
Finland 2004 Exemption for substantial holdings
Slovenia 2007 50% Exemption for substantial holdings
Norway 2004 Exemption for substantial holdings
France 2006 Reduction of tax rate from 19% to 8%
Turkey 2006 Introduction
Iceland 2009 General Exemption
estimate the effect of capital gains taxation on corporate acquisition activity.
3.2 Aggregate M&A Activity
Data on corporate acquisitions is obtained from the Zephyr database provided by
Bureau van Dijk. An important advantage of Zephyr which is relevant for the purposes
of this analysis is that it contains detailed vendor characteristics for each deal. Such
information is critical to identify the deals associated with corporate capital gains tax
payments and to exclude deals with individual shareholders as vendors.4
In the analysis, we consider cash paid acquisitions of shares in the period 2002-
2013 where a corporation sells one of its domestic affiliates.5 We use the vendor’s legal
form and name to establish whether the vendor entity is liable for corporation tax
according to the regulations of the country it is registered in.6 The majority of deals
4Moreover, as pointed out by Erel et al. (2015), Zephyr’s coverage of acquisitions outside the stock
market is superior to alternative databases. This is convenient as, for reasons explained below, we
expect acquisitions of non-listed targets to be particularly affected by corporate capital gains taxes.
5We do not consider vendors selling their holdings in foreign firms since these deals are taxed
differently in some countries (e.g. Australia). In a robustness check we also include deals where
vendor and target reside in different countries and obtain qualitatively similar results.
6For some deals no vendor information is available. It is reasonable to assume that in this case
the vendors comprise mainly individual shareholders and we therefore exclude these deals.
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Figure 1: Tax Rate Changes
This figure displays the cumulated tax rate changes in the sample period. Changes in the corporate
capital gains tax rate refer to changes in the rate charged on capital gains realized by corporations
when selling shares in substantial holdings not listed on the stock market. Changes in the corporate
tax rate refer to changes in the standard rate on corporate profits.
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in our sample (>95%) involve an unlisted target. In the rare case where the target
is listed, various mechanisms that cannot be controlled for in an aggregated panel
may affect the deal completion (see Faccio et al., 2006; Officer, 2007) and these deals
are therefore not included in the analysis.7 The number and total value of deals is
aggregated by country and year according to the residence of the selling firm and the
completion date of each deal. Using the completion date avoids a bias of our estimate
caused by timing issues in case corporations anticipate tax changes and announce
deals in advance. Where the completion date is not available in Zephyr, we compute
it by taking the median number of days between announcement and completion across
the deals with available data in the same year and country and adding this duration
to the announcement date provided.8
Table 2 provides an overview of the deals included in our estimation. It reports the
number and volume of deals by residence country of the vendor company. In total, we
consider 30,545 acquisitions with a combined volume of 1,106.08 bn USD. In most of
these deals, the vendor resided in one of the largest economies (i.e. United States, the
United Kingdom, Japan and Germany) but the completion of deals is also substantial
in number and volume in several smaller countries such as Finland and Sweden, where
corporate capital gains tax reforms may have affected acquisition activity.
7To ensure robustness, we re-estimated our model including listed targets and obtain similar
results.
8We conduct a robustness check by computing the time between announcement and completion
using nearest neighbor matching. In particular, we take the power-distance weighted average over the
five closest deals regarding announcement within the same country. Results are displayed in Table
A.2.
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Table 2: Corporate M&As, 2002-2013
This table presents the number and volume of deals with cash payment and corporate vendors per
country from 2002-2013 as recorded in the Zephyr database. Listed targets and targets not residing
in the country of the vendor are excluded. The deals are assigned to the country of residence of the
vendor company. Deal volume is the sum of reported deal values. Data is trimmed at the 1st and
99th percentile according to deal value.
Number of deals Deal volume in bn USD Corporate capital gains
tax rate, 2013
Australia 1,056 44.95 30.00
Austria 330 7.17 25.00
Belgium 486 10.80 0.04
Canada 753 30.20 20.27
Croatia 69 0.32 20.00
Cyprus 56 3.08 20.00
Denmark 765 17.34 0.00
Finland 1,169 8.74 0.00
France 1,744 60.54 4.33
Germany 2,359 65.74 1.48
Greece 168 3.72 26.00
Iceland 46 0.71 0.00
Ireland 123 7.07 0.00
Israel 114 4.85 25.00
Italy 1,208 62.90 1.57
Japan 2,263 40.24 42.00
Luxembourg 32 2.70 0.00
Mexico 63 6.27 30.00
Netherlands 1,744 40.75 0.00
New Zealand 180 4.80 0.00
Norway 901 17.49 0.00
Portugal 218 10.91 12.50
Slovenia 50 0.78 8.50
South Korea 238 16.05 24.20
Spain 1,277 46.81 0.00
Sweden 1,550 24.36 0.00
Switzerland 665 12.02 0.00
Turkey 266 22.98 20.00
United Kingdom 4,617 172.19 0.00
United States 6,035 359.58 39.28
Total 30,545 1,106.08
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3.3 Estimation
In our empirical analysis, we estimate a reduced form of expression (4). We model the
number and volume of acquisitions as a non-linear function of the corporate capital
gains tax rate and a range of control variables:
nit = exp
(
γτCGit + βXit + φi + φt
)
+ it (5)
where nit denotes the number or total value of acquisitions, τCGit is the corpo-
rate capital gains tax rate, Xit denotes a vector of control variables and φi and φt
are country- and year-fixed effects, respectively. The model is estimated using the
Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator. Besides being widely used in
the analysis of count data, Silva & Tenreyro (2011) have shown that PPML is also
well suited for (but not restricted to) analyzing data with a substantial number of
zeros. The PPML specification includes time and country fixed effects to account for
time trends and unobserved variables that are constant over time but differ across
countries.9
As we have noted above, the corporate capital gains tax rate is usually closely
linked to the standard tax rate (CT ) for corporations. We thus also include the latter
in the estimation to capture any changes in acquisition activity related to corporate
tax changes. Furthermore, we include a set of control variables that may influence
acquisition activity on the aggregate level. These include GDP, the annual growth rate
of GDP (see Erel et al., 2012; Rossi & Volpin, 2004), inflation, the trade ratio10, as well
as the size of the stock market (Di Giovanni, 2005) and credit available for corporate
acquisitions. In addition, we control for the size of the service sector and institutional
quality on the country level measured by the Corruption Perception Index (Hebous
et al., 2011). The latter also serves as a proxy for the level of shareholder protection.
In line with previous research, we lag the macroeconomic variables by one period to
reflect that the decision makers’ information set is based on completed rather than
contemporaneous periods and to mitigate potential endogeneity problems. Table 3
provides summary statistics of all variables. A detailed description of all controls and
their sources can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
4 Results
In Table 4 we present the results of our estimation with regard to the number of
M&A deals. Column (1) depicts our main specification. We obtain a coefficient of
9See Fally (2015) for a feasible implementation of fixed effects in the PPML model.
10The trade ratio is defined as the share of total exports and imports in GDP.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Number of
Observations
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Number of deals 390 78.32 109.42 0 667.00
Value of deals in bn USD 390 2.84 5.63 0 41.99
CGT 390 12.99 13.76 0 42.10
CT 390 28.16 7.29 10.00 42.10
GDP 390 26.70 1.59 23.38 30.30
GROWTH 390 1.76 2.86 -8.86 9.72
INFL 390 2.72 3.98 -5.39 52.85
TRADE 387 4.31 0.50 3.01 5.92
STOCK 360 0.73 0.49 0.09 3.38
CREDIT 373 1.15 0.53 0.12 3.11
SERV ICE 340 68.13 13.86 0.56 87.47
CI 359 7.18 1.82 2.97 9.70
-0.011 with respect to the corporate capital gains tax rate which is significant at the
one percent level. This suggests that a one percentage point decrease in the corporate
capital gains tax rate is expected to increase the number of acquisitions by 1.1% per
year.
Regarding control variables, more output growth, international trade, a higher
level of governance quality and a better access to credit significantly increase the
number of M&As. As in Di Giovanni (2005), larger financial markets are positively
correlated with the number of acquisitions. Similarly, larger service sectors indicate
higher M&A activity. In contrast, inflation is negatively related to acquisition activ-
ity as the economic insecurity related to high inflation rates potentially discourages
M&As.
The coefficient for GDP is insignificant, perhaps reflecting that both high and low
levels of GDP may increase acquisition activity11 within one country since M&As are
used for expansion in economically favorable environments and to consolidate sectors
in times of economic contraction. In our estimation the corporate tax rate does not
significantly affect corporate acquisition activity. This suggests that from the vendor
perspective the impact of corporate taxation is mainly related to the lock-in effect
resulting from capital gains taxation.
Table 4 also contains several sensitivity checks. First, we check whether our re-
sults are driven by jurisdictions that position themselves as preferable location for
holding companies. Potential candidates in our sample are Cyprus, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, the Netherlands and Switzerland because of their lack of substantial
Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules and the dividend and capital gains tax
11See Grave et al. (2012) for an account of M&As during the financial crisis.
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Table 4: Corporate Capital Gains Tax and Acquisition Activity
Estimation with PPML. The dependent variable is the number of M&A deals per year and country
in which a corporate vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a
consideration that involves a cash payment. Regression (1) contains the main specification. In regres-
sions (2) countries which are referred to as preferred holding locations are excluded. Regression (3)
excludes all country-year pairs with zero acquisitions. Regression (4) extends the main specification
by controlling for industry specific shocks whereas in regression (5) the interest rate on government
securities is included as an additional control. Regression (6) controls for the lagged share of deals
with foreign acquirers. All regressions include country- and year-fixed effects. Cluster robust standard
errors (clustered at the country level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate
the significance level, ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τCG -0.011***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.011***
(0.004)
-0.010**
(0.005)
-0.011***
(0.005)
-0.011***
(0.004)
CT 0.001
(0.015)
0.006
(0.017)
0.002
(0.015)
0.007
(0.021)
0.002
(0.015)
-0.000
(0.014)
GDP -0.580
(1.277)
-0.559
(1.261)
-0.592
(1.277)
-0.704
(1.683)
-0.636
(1.339)
-0.435
(1.148)
GROWTH 0.043***
(0.013)
0.041***
(0.13)
0.043***
(0.13)
0.049**
(0.020)
0.039***
(0.013)
0.038***
(0.013)
INFL -0.007
(0.011)
-0.007
(0.012)
-0.006
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.006
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.010)
TRADE 1.039**
(0.451)
1.032**
(0.480)
1.004**
(0.451)
1.485***
(0.541)
0.957**
(0.442)
0.928**
(0.385)
STOCK 0.170
(0.206)
0.262
(0.284)
0.179
(0.205)
0.216
(0.274)
0.208
(0.207)
0.156
(0.191)
CREDIT 0.420**
(0.192)
0.409**
(0.200)
0.419**
(0.190)
0.076
(0.207)
0.415**
(0.185)
0.353*
(0.181)
SERV ICE 0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
0.021
(0.026)
0.001
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
CI 0.232**
(0.118)
0.247**
(0.125)
0.233**
(0.118)
0.203
(0.126)
0.242**
(0.120)
0.191*
(0.103)
INDSHCK 0.277
(0.956)
INTEREST -0.011
(0.030)
FOREIGN -0.649***
(0.226)
Holding locations Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Including zeros Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
n 332 278 320 184 325 332
Number of countries 30 25 30 24 30 30
Pseudo Log-likelihood -1507.793 -1320.748 -1461.025 -780.161 -1471.617 -1479.224
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exemption granted.12 While these countries have low tax rates for corporate capital
gains, the factors that actually raise acquisition activity there may be unrelated to
taxation. This could induce a downward bias in our estimate. In column (2) we thus
re-estimate the model excluding the countries cited above. The coefficient for τCG
remains significantly negative with very similar point estimates.
Second, for a number of country-year pairs we have no M&A deals. Even though
this could simply imply that in these years there were no corporate acquisitions ac-
cording to our definition, the observations could also result from a measurement error,
perhaps caused by lower reporting quality in certain countries. To check whether this
drives our results we re-estimate the model including only observations with strictly
positive values for the dependent variable. Again, the coefficient for our variable of
interest remains significantly negative with almost identical point estimates.
Finally, to verify that our results are not driven by some spurious correlation we
include additional control variables in columns (4) to (6). Following Ayers et al. (2007),
we first include the standard deviation in value added growth across eight sectors
within a country to account for sector specific shocks that may increase acquisition
activity by triggering sector specific consolidation. In a second exercise, we use the
interest rate on government securities as a proxy for country-specific financing costs
that might drive M&As. In both cases, the coefficient for the variable of interest
remains unchanged and significant.
Results also remain similar when including the lagged share of foreign acquir-
ers as a control variable (FOREIGN).13 This should ensure that the findings are
not due to some other omitted variable which changes a country’s appeal to foreign
acquirers such as reductions in withholding taxes14, reductions in tariffs, or closer
economic integration via custom or currency unions. If such changes coincide with a
cut in corporate capital gains taxes, the resulting inflow of foreign acquirers may bias
the coefficient estimates downwards.15 However, results indicate that the evidence
presented is not explained by changes in the relevance of foreign acquisitions.
If our results capture a quantity effect of corporate capital gains taxes, this should
be observable not only in the number but also in the volume of M&A deals. To verify
that this is indeed the case, we reestimate our results using aggregated deal values
as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 5. Again the coefficient
for the capital gains tax rate is significantly negative. With a magnitude of -0.011 in
12Smith (2011) reviews the relevant rules in these countries in more detail.
13Similar results are obtained when including the contemporary share of foreign acquirers, the
number and the volume of deals with foreign acquirers.
14For the effect of cross-border tax differentials on the reservation price of foreign acquirers see
Huizinga & Voget (2009).
15For example, the legislative proposal for abolishing the taxation of corporate capital gains in
Sweden in 2003 also contained a participation exemption for withholding taxes on dividends paid to
non-residential companies.
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our main specification in column (1) it suggests that decreasing the corporate capital
gains tax rate by one percentage point should increase the total volume of acquisitions
by 1.1% per year. Thus, our results regarding the quantity of the lock-in effect caused
by corporate capital gains taxes cannot simply be explained by a change in the size
of M&A deals but reflect a decrease in real acquisition activity.
The corporate tax reforms that provide the main source of variance in our esti-
mation should generally not affect acquisitions where the vendor is not incorporated
which makes these deals a useful comparison group to verify the causality of our
estimates. This allows us to test whether it is the change in the corporate capital
gains tax rate that affects acquisition activity or some coinciding regulatory measure
that provides incentives for corporate investment. Whereas the latter should affect
all acquisitions independent of the vendor’s tax status, the former is only relevant for
corporate vendors.
In a first step, we conduct a simple acid test using the number of acquisitions with
non-corporate vendors16 as the dependent variable. Results are presented in column
(1) of Table 6. As expected, changing the corporate capital gains tax rate has no effect
on the number and volume of these deals corroborating that the coefficient of capital
gains tax in the benchmark regression indeed captures a causal effect.
An alternative approach to verify the causality underlying our estimation results
is to use the number of deals that involve an unincorporated vendor as a control group
in a pooled regression. In a triple difference-in-difference approach, this allows us to
estimate the effect of a change in the corporate capital gains tax rate on acquisition
activity involving only corporate vendors relative to acquisition activity involving
unincorporated vendors. The latter should be less affected by capital gains taxation
on the corporate level. Thus, we estimate a model of the following form
njit = exp (γ0V ENjit + γ1V ENjit × POSTit + βXit + φi + φt) + it (6)
where nijt indicates the number of deals in country i at time t for vendor type j. With
regard to the vendor type we sort deals into two groups. V ENjit = 1 indicates deals
with vendors that are fully affected by corporate capital gains taxes (type-C deals)
and V ENjit = 0 indicates those deals that are mainly affected by individual taxation
(type-I deals).17 POSTit is a dummy variable that indicates whether at some point
t− s, s > 0, there was a substantial reduction in the corporate capital gains tax rate
16We show that our results carry over to the total deal value by reestimating the following re-
gressions with the aggregated deal value of acquisitions with non-corporate vendors as dependent
variable. Results are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
17This comprises all deals where at least part of the vendors do not pay corporation taxes but are
taxed on the individual level.
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Table 5: Corporate Capital Gains Tax and Total Deal Value
Estimation with PPML. The dependent variable is the sum of all values of M&A deals per year and
country in which a corporate vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and
receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Regression (1) contains the main specifica-
tion. In regression (2) countries which are referred to as preferred holding locations are excluded.
Regression (3) excludes all country-year pairs with zero acquisitions. Regression (4) extends the main
specification by controlling for industry specific shocks whereas in regression (5) the interest rate on
government securities is included as an additional control. Regression (6) controls for the lagged
share of deals with foreign acquirers. All regressions include country- and year-fixed effects. Cluster
robust standard errors (clustered at the country level) are provided in parentheses. Stars behind
coefficients indicate the significance level, ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τCG -0.011**
(0.005)
-0.011**
(0.005)
-0.011**
(0.005)
-0.011***
(0.004)
-0.011**
(0.005)
-0.012***
(0.005)
CT -0.000
(0.024)
-0.008
(0.023)
-0.001
(0.023)
0.005
(0.031)
-0.001
(0.024)
-0.003
(0.024)
GDP 2.069*
(1.233)
2.467
(1.324)
1.971
(1.201)
0.351
(1.629)
2.181*
(1.305)
2.206*
(1.220)
GROWTH 0.040*
(0.024)
0.035
(0.026)
0.037
(0.024)
0.053
(0.039)
0.041*
(0.024)
0.040
(0.025)
INFL -0.053***
(0.015)
-0.048**
(0.015)
-0.054**
(0.015)
-0.047***
(0.015)
-0.053***
(0.015)
-0.053***
(0.015)
TRADE -0.018
(0.947)
-0.137
(0.991)
0.022
(0.950)
1.494
(1.060)
-0.032
(0.955)
0.041
(0.897)
STOCK 0.219
(0.208)
0.351
(0.243)
0.199
(0.199)
0.210
(0.273)
0.220
(0.206)
0.147
(0.200)
CREDIT -0.062
(0.276)
-0.222
(0.298)
-0.043
(0.268)
0.844**
(0.362)
-0.074
(0.279)
-0.083
(0.271)
SERV ICE 0.012***
(0.004)
0.012**
(0.004)
0.012**
(0.004)
-0.008
(0.055)
0.012***
(0.004)
0.012***
(0.003)
CI 0.234**
(0.116)
0.186
(0.118)
0.246*
(0.121)
0.358**
(0.150)
0.237**
(0.115)
0.218
(0.112)
INDSHCK -3.004
(4.652)
INTEREST 0.010
(0.035)
FOREIGN -0.307*
(0.162)
Holding locations Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Including zeros Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
n 332 278 308 184 325 332
Number of countries 30 25 30 24 30 30
Pseudo Log-likelihood -71060217 -59870868 -66478786 -40562846 -70920574 -69858363
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in country i. In this case POSTit is equal to 1, otherwise it is zero. We identify the
relevant tax cuts according to the reforms listed in Table 1 (e.g. in the case of Italy,
POSTit = 1 from 2004 onward and zero before).
In equation (6), γ1 measures the expected additional rise in the number of type-C
deals relative to the number of type-I deals that is caused by the existence of a sub-
stantial corporate capital gains tax exemption. Column (2) in Table 6 displays the
estimation results. As expected, the coefficient of V ENjit × POSTit is positive and
highly significant. The estimated coefficients suggest that the presence of a corporate
capital gains tax reduction increases the ratio of the number of type-C and type-I
deals by a factor of 2.05. One explanation for this result is that a lower corporate
capital gains tax rate makes firms with corporate shareholders only a more attrac-
tive target for acquisition relative to firms where potential deal participants include
individual shareholders that do not benefit from the corporate capital gains exemp-
tion. This further supports the causal inference of our results and also provides a
tax-related reasoning for the observed dominance of inter-corporate acquisitions.
To gain additional insights, we modify equation (6) to allow for heterogeneity in
the effect of the tax reform with regard to the induced tax cuts. This is achieved
by replacing POSTit with the tax rate change caused by the corporate capital gains
tax reduction, ∆τCGReform, in post-reform years. In such an adjustment, γ1 measures
the expected additional rise in the number of type-C deals relative to the number of
type-I deals that is caused by a reduction in the corporate capital gains tax rate by 1
percentage point. To account for potentially coinciding tax reforms on the individual
shareholder level, we also estimate the equation using the change in the difference in
corporate and individual capital gains tax rates caused by the corporate capital gains
tax reform, ∆˜τCGReform =
(
τCGt − τ INDt
)− (τCGt−1 − τ INDt−1 ).18
Estimation results are displayed in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. Again, the
coefficients are positive and highly significant. Quantitatively, these results indicate
that the presence of a corporate capital gains tax exemption increases the ratio of
the number of type-C and type-I deals by a factor of 1.03 (or 2.9%) per percentage
point of tax rate reduction. An almost identical coefficient in column (4) shows that
these findings are robust to accounting for coinciding reductions in the capital gains
tax rate on the individual shareholder level. Thus, inter-corporate acquisition activity
does not only react to the mere presence of a capital gains tax reduction but is also
determined by the magnitude of such an exemption.
Finally, we can use our estimates to compute the potential efficiency loss resulting
from the taxation of capital gains in inter-corporate M&As. The efficiency loss is
defined as the foregone gain from a failed M&A deal. We use acquisition premia
18Note that ∆˜τCGReform = ∆τ
CG
Reform if ∆τ
IND = 0.
15
Table 6: Triple Difference-in-Difference Approach
Estimation with PPML. In regressions (1) the dependent variable is the number of M&A deals per
year and country in which an non-corporate vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the same
country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Otherwise the specification is
identical to column (1) in Table 4. In regressions (2)-(4) the dependent variable is the number of
M&A deals per year, country and vendor type in which the vendor sells shares in a target firm residing
in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Regression (2) includes
a country-specific dummy variable POST . Regression (3) repeats this regression using the absolute
change in the corporate capital gains income tax generated by the reform instead of a post-reform
dummy. Regression (4) replicates the results using the absolute change in the difference between
corporate capital gains income taxes and individual capital gains taxes generated by the reform. All
regression include country- and year-fixed effects as well as year-vendor-type-fixed effects. Cluster
robust standard (clustered at the country-vendor-type level) errors are provided in parentheses.Stars
behind coefficients indicate the significance level, , ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τCG 0.004
(0.007)
V EN × POST 0.717***
(0.266)
V EN ×∆τCGReform 0.029***
(0.009)
V EN × ∆˜τCGReform 0.029***
(0.009)
V EN 1.255***
(0.228)
1.238***
(0.213)
1.254***
(0.214)
CT -0.016
(0.020)
0.008
(0.014)
0.011
(0.013)
0.010
(0.014)
GDP 0.054
(0.038)
-0.057
(1.324)
-0.409
(1.199)
-0.521
(1.178)
GROWTH 0.054
(0.038)
0.034**
(0.014)
0.036***
(0.013)
0.036***
(0.013)
INFL -0.004
(0.023)
-0.004
(0.011)
-0.005
(0.011)
-0.006
(0.011)
TRADE 0.110
(0.848)
1.319***
(0.464)
1.115***
(0.399)
1.089***
(0.397)
STOCK 0.192
(0.475)
0.182
(0.207)
0.159
(0.207)
0.152
(0.209)
CREDIT 0.059
(0.590)
0.231
(0.194)
0.262
(0.177)
0.262
(0.176)
SERV ICE -0.002
(0.004)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
CI 0.621***
(0.161)
0.150
(0.129)
0.168
(0.118)
0.163
(0.119)
n 297 663 663 663
Number of countries 27 30 30 30
Pseudo Log-likelihood -699.615 -3952.9 -3894.3 -3913.7
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Table 7: Efficiency Loss (in mio USD)
This table displays the yearly efficiency loss in million USD caused by corporate capital gains
taxation of the transfer of shares in inter-corporate M&A. The efficiency loss is defined as
the foregone gain from all failed M&A deals. Details regarding the computation can be found
in the Appendix.
Australia Canada Japan United States
Corporate Capital Gains Tax Rate, 2013 30.00 20.27 42.00 39.28
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 13.17 22.04 49.29 304.46
Manufacturing 21.54 27.16 107.97 843.73
Mining and Construction 40.80 22.15 3.60 140.90
Services 31.25 18.24 85.82 828.17
Other 33.90 35.34 59.24 946.99
Total 140.67 124.92 305.92 3,064.24
reported in Zephyr as a market-related measure of this gain and compute country- and
sector-specific acquisition premia for the sample period. We then consider a decrease
in the corporate capital gains rate to zero in 2013 and use our coefficient estimate from
Table 5 to evaluate the effect at the yearly mean of the deal volume. This provides us
with a country- and sector specific estimate of the yearly deal volume foregone due to
capital gains taxation from which we back out the efficiency loss using the previously
computed acquisition premia.
Table 7 presents our results for Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States.
All of these economies still levied capital gains taxation on corporate acquisitions in
2013. The computed efficiency losses are substantial, most notably in Japan and the
United States where corporate vendors face particularly high tax rates. Our estimates
suggest that a full exemption of capital gains from corporate M&A deals would gen-
erate a yearly efficiency gain in the market for corporate control of 0.31 bn USD in
Japan and 3.06 bn USD in the United States.
5 Conclusion
The estimation results presented above suggest a significant lock-in effect for corporate
capital gains taxes. Using a panel-data in a PPML model, we arrive at a coefficient for
the corporate capital gains tax of -0.011 for both the total deal value and the number
of acquisitions. This translates into an increase of acquisition activity by 1.1% for a
decrease of the tax rate by one percentage point which result allows us to estimate
the potential efficiency loss caused by corporate capital gains taxation in terms of
foregone gains from M&A deals. For example, we consider a decrease of the United
17
States tax rate on corporate capital gains (39.28% in 201319) to zero. Evaluated at
the country mean for 2002-2013, this would imply an increase in efficiency on the
market for corporate control by 3.06 bn USD per year.
These findings have several important implications. First, lowering the capital
gains tax on the corporate level appears to be an effective instrument to foster acqui-
sition activity. In light of potentially high efficiency gains resulting from M&A deals,
tax cuts are thus worth considering, in particular in several large economies where
capital gains tax rates are still high (e.g. United States, Australia, Canada, Japan).
Second, using international data our results suggest a lock-in effect on inter-
corporate acquisitions that is smaller than previously estimated in time-series studies
for individual shareholder taxation (e.g. Ayers et al., 2007). This may partly reflect
the use of different samples but also indicates that, on the global scale, corporations
are less reactive to capital gains taxes in their acquisition behavior than individuals.
One reason for this may be that capital gains taxation affects individual shareholders’
income directly whereas managers who take decisions at the corporate level are only
indirectly affected via the impact of annual firm yields on their reputation and can
take a more long-term view on acquisitions.
Third, our results imply that corporate tax reforms that reduce capital gains taxes
may be revenue neutral in a similar way as has been previously suggested for the case of
shareholder taxation (e.g. Feldstein et al., 1980). Although the increase in acquisition
activity may not fully compensate the revenue loss, in particular if capital gains are
fully exempt, the resulting efficiency gains would still raise government revenue from
taxing higher corporate profits.
Our estimate of the efficiency loss of corporate capital gains taxation in M&A takes
the shareholder perspective. The overall economic effect of increased M&A activity
caused by lower corporate capital gains taxation depends on a range of factors not
included in this measure. These include externalities such as the potentially inefficient
use of production factors in transition periods and market distortion resulting from
reduced competition after mergers. Therefore, it remains an interesting question for
future research whether and under what circumstances lower corporate capital gains
taxation triggers acquisitions related to particularly strong improvements in corpo-
rate performance, in particular with regard to productivity. Besides broadening the
understanding of the market for corporate control, this would provide further insights
into the welfare implications of corporate capital gains taxes.
19Including state taxes.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Control Variables
Variable Definition Source
GDP Logarithm of GDP in constant
(2005) USD
WDI
GROWTH Annual GDP growth in % WDI
CREDIT Domestic credit to private sector
as a share of GDP
WDI
STOCK Market capitalization of listed
firms as a share of GDP
WDI
CT Top statutory corporate income
tax rate
IBFD
TRADE Logarithm of the trade ratio WDI
CI Corruption perception index TI
INFL Inflation WDI
SERV ICE Value added of services in % of
GDP
WDI
INTEREST Interest rate on national
government securities
Central Banks
INDSK Standard deviation in value added
growth across 8 sectors
WDI
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Table A.2: Robustness: Nearest-Neighbor Matching
This table replicates Table 4 using weighted nearest neighbor interpolation to compute the time
between deal announcement and completion. Distance dij is measured in absolute number of days
between the announcement dates of two deals i and j. We include the five nearest neighbors, use power
distance weights with an exponent α = 3 and row-normalize weights so that the weight for observation
j within the 5 nearest neighbors is given by wij = d−αij /
∑5
j=1 d
−α
ij . Estimation with PPML. The
dependent variable is the number of M&A deals per year and country in which a corporate vendor
sells shares in a target firm residing in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a
cash payment. Regression (1) contains the main specification. In regression (2), countries which are
referred to as preferred holding locations are excluded. Regression (3) excludes all country-year pairs
with zero acquisitions. Cluster robust standard (clustered at the country level) errors are provided
in parentheses. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
(1) (2) (3)
τCG -0.010**
(0.005)
-0.011**
(0.005)
-0.011**
(0.005)
CT -0.002
(0.014)
-0.002
(0.014)
-0.004
(0.016)
GDP -0.617
(1.306)
-0.578
(1.300)
-0.612
(1.297)
GROWTH 0.042***
(0.012)
0.043***
(0.012)
0.041***
(0.012)
INFL -0.005
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.010)
-0.006
(0.011)
TRADE 0.797*
(0.430)
0.803*
(0.428)
0.816*
(0.459)
STOCK 0.160
(0.430)
0.162
(0.188)
0.259
(0.263)
CREDIT 0.354*
(0.191)
0.359*
(0.190)
0.345*
(0.204)
SERV ICE 0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
CI 0.262**
(0.119)
0.264**
(0.119)
0.273**
(0.128)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Holding locations Yes Yes No
Including zeros Yes No Yes
n 332 330 278
Number of countries 30 30 25
Pseudo Log-likelihood -1519.531 -1509.402 -1337.557
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Table A.3: Triple Difference-in-Difference Approach: Total Deal Value
Estimation with PPML. In regressions (1) the dependent variable is the sum of all values of M&A
deals per year and country in which a non-corporate vendor sells shares in a target firm residing in the
same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Otherwise the specification is
identical to column (1) in Table 4. In regressions (2)-(4) the dependent variable is the sum of all values
of M&A deals per year, country and vendor type in which the vendor sells shares in a target firm
residing in the same country and receives a consideration that involves a cash payment. Regression
(2) includes a country-specific dummy variable POST . Regression (3) repeats this regression using
the absolute change in the corporate capital gains income tax generated by the reform instead
of a post-reform dummy. Regression (4) replicates the results using the absolute change in the
difference between corporate capital gains income taxes and individual capital gains taxes generated
by the reform. All regression include country- and year-fixed effects as well as year-vendor-type-fixed
effects. Cluster robust standard (clustered at the country-vendor-type level) errors are provided in
parentheses.Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, , ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τCG
0.004
(0.007)
V EN × POST 1.269***
(0.325)
V EN ×∆τCGReform
0.053***
(0.010)
V EN × ∆˜τCGReform
0.054***
(0.010)
V EN
0.184
(0.295)
0.167
(0.299)
0.187
(0.300)
CT
-0.033
(0.091)
0.019
(0.021)
0.019
(0.021)
0.018
(0.021)
GDP
1.352
(4.145)
3.233**
(1.418)
2.865**
(1.180)
2.724**
(1.179)
GROWTH
-0.037
(0.070)
0.039
(0.029)
0.040
(0.028)
0.040
(0.028)
INFL
0.024
(0.052)
-0.039***
(0.014)
-0.037***
(0.014)
-0.039***
(0.014)
TRADE
-1.122
(1.173)
0.939
(0.972)
0.692
(0.851)
0.654
(0.848)
STOCK
0.765
(0.801)
-0.207
(0.289)
-0.239
(0.280)
-0.249
(0.280)
CREDIT
-1.340
(1.359)
0.151
(0.270)
0.180
(0.253)
0.184
(0.251)
SERV ICE
-0.005
(0.007)
0.012**
(0.005)
0.011**
(0.005)
0.011**
(0.005)
CI
0.002
(0.472)
0.026
(0.156)
0.056
(0.126)
0.051
(0.128)
n 297 663 663. 663
Number of countries 27 30 30 30
Pseudo Log-likelihood -699.615 -2.3e+08 -2.2e+08 -2.2e+08
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Computing the Efficiency Loss
In the following we describe the computation of the country- and sector-specific yearly
efficiency loss in USD displayed in Table 7. The four main sectors are defined accord-
ing to SIC codes: Mining and Construction (1000-1799), Manufacturing (2000-3999),
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (6000-6799) and Services (7000-8999). We first
compute country- and sector specific gains from M&A deals for the period 2002-2013.
For this purpose we use acquisition premia reported in the Zephyr data base. The
acquisition premium of a deal is defined as the deal value less the market price of the
target one day prior to the announcement divided by the latter. For each country and
sector, we compute the mean of all premia in percent. Noting that our estimates in Ta-
ble 5 suggest that a decrease of the corporate capital gains rate by 1 percentage points
raises acquisition activity in terms of total deal volume by 1.1%, the yearly efficiency
loss Γis in country i and sector s is then given by Γis = τCGis × 0.011× nis × piis100+piis ,
where τCGis is the corporate capital gains tax rate used in the main regression, nis is
the average deal volume per year and piis is the average acquisition premium.
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